The historical development of Indian philosophy
One globally attested phenomenon in history is the stark change in the nature of human thought between the Bronze and Iron Ages. While the Bronze Age people were not completely devoid of knowledge, the pursuit of knowledge as an end in itself, the scientific temparament (i.e. moving away from “magical” explanations), and introspection upon this knowledge did not exist until the so-called Axial Age starting c. 800 BC.
The causes for this revolution ought to be a central topic for historical study, and India being the birthplace of these innovations is the most valuable context to study this in. This note is a look at the development of philosophy in India from the earliest times up to the canonization period (~1000—100 BC), with some very brief comments on later developments for completeness, and examines the reasons why philosophy took exactly the shape it did.
Origins of Indian philosophy (1000—800 BC)
There appear to be three basic motivating roots of Indian philosophy:
Intellectual speculation, such as in Yajurveda and Book 10 of Ṛgveda, leading to questions about the nature of consciousness, afterlife and the creation of the universe.
Induction of ascetic, i.e. śramaṇa practices, perhaps of non-Vedic origin (e.g. Vrātyas), in the form of Saṃnyāsa, demanding rationalization of meditation.
Vedāṅga, i.e. the emphasis on precision in speech, thought and ritual as demanded for Vedic practice, motivating work in linguistics, exegesis, music and geometry
One of the clearest picture of the origins of Indian philosophy, especially from the third root, is provided by Yāska (c. 700 BC), who divides those who exegeted the Vedas into seven categories: Nairukta (etymologists), Aitihāsika (historians), Naidana (mixture of etymology and history), Pārivrājaka (ascetics or philosophers), Dharmaśāstrika (moralists), Vaiyākaraṇa (grammarians). For a comprehensive source see [1] Yāska and Pāṇini by Sreenivas Rao.
Pre-scholastic period (800—600 BC)
1—2 motivated the composition of the Upaniṣads; 3 motivated the composition of the Brāhmaṇas. The Āraṇyakas were the bridge between the two.
These were not yet competing points of view: and it was often the same figures involved in the composition of both, e.g. Yājñavalkya composed the most important (and one of the earliest) texts of each genre: Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad and the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. In fact, some texts fit into both genres, or formed a supplement to a text of another genre.
In this period there are no firmly-set views, as the goal of philosophy was not to be right but to win debates. Those who won debates were rewarded with wealth, honour and wives, while losers were humiliated, exiled or (in this early period) even killed.
Some common themes and vocabulary in Indian philosophy, which will be useful to know for the subsequent sections.
Pramāṇas (ways of knowing or epistemology) — pratyakṣa (empirical observation), anumāna (inference), śabda (communication), upamāna (analogy), arthāpatti (also inference), anupalabdi (falsification). The formalization of epistemology was likely motivated by the culture of debate, which required the specification of which arguments were valid (see Jayatilleke for details).
Puruṣa/Vijñāna/Jīva (consciousness or life force) — i.e. if there is a distinction between a person and a philosophical zombie.
Ātman (self) — i.e. if different Jīvas are differentiated from each other.
Brahman (universal consciousness) — of which all ātmans are incarnations.
Pariṇāmavāda (causality) — with application to moral responsibility and retribution, and to the idea of Brahman as “primitive cause”(i.e. a creator god).
Jñāna vs Karma (meditative and ascetic practices vs ritual) — “1 and 2” vs “3” above. The terms also acquire the more general meanings of “knowledge” and “work” in socio-political literature.
Dukkha (suffering) — a negative-utilitarian bent is seen in the Śramaṇa tradition.
Puruṣārtha (human goals) — artha (wealth or higher pleasures), kāma (love or sensual pleasures), dharma (ethical conduct or charity), and optionally a fourth: mokṣa (success in meditative practices); this is a theme from the socio-political literature, and forms a normative theory.
Saṃsāra (rebirth); heaven, hell, and gods — old religion was analyzed in the new framework, by positing heaven/hell as places one may be reborn in, gods (in this period called Īśvaras, though the term would later acquire a monotheistic meaning) as regular (though distinguished or more capable) ātmans, and a monotheistic God “Brahmā” as the personification of Brahman.
Formation of schools; lost works (600—300 BC)
A classification I will use, that is idiosyncratic to me, but which reflects their historical development and common features, and I think are the best way to understand these schools without the colour given to them by commentators biased towards their own. Roughly: I use Brāhmaṇa and Śramaṇa as indicators of cultural clusters in early times, and Āstika and Nāstika as indicating whether they accept a metaphysics. Hence referred to as AB, AS, NB, NS.
While these are the schools generally listed of “Indian philosophy”, there was also parallel socio-political tradition that emerged in the same period, i.e. the Artha and Dharmasūtra literature, which contributed significantly to the philosophy of ethics. The earliest of this is the Kalpasūtra genre, consisting of the Gṛhyasūtras (800—500 BC), the Dharmasūtras (600—200 BC) and the Śrautasūtras (800—200 BC). These scholars often organized into schools named after ancient sages, perhaps reflecting gotras, such as Manu, Gautama, Vasiṣṭha, Bhāradvaja, Parāśara, and most importantly: Bṛhaspati. The school of Bṛhaspati was, in particular, responsible for the foundation of the Artha tradition, later expounded by the giant Kautilya, and for their origination of the NB philosophy.
Summary of metaphysics: A* schools accept Jīva; N* reject it. Although only AB explicitly accept Ātman and Brahman, AS schools “functionally” have it in the form of rebirth and mokṣa respectively. On ascetism vs. ritual, *S reject ritual and embrace ascetism, NB rejects both, AB is divided: Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Vedānta have a syncretic view (emphasize “true understanding” of ritual), Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika say “Sir this is a Natural Philosophy”, Mīmāṃsā and socio-political traditions reject ascetism and embrace ritual.
Descriptions of AB (i.e. “Hindu”) schools. In some cases these were directly opposed to one another, but often they were seen as concentrating on different aspects of philosophy, and didn’t neatly translate into the disagreements different philosophers had with each other. Generally speaking: N-V codify the Hindus’ philosophy of Ānvīkṣikī (physical science and logic, though e.g. Kautilya uses this term to include S-Y), S-Y codify their metaphysics and M-V codify its philosophy of religion and language.
Nyāya — the theory of natural law, i.e. the stance that the universe is governed by some rules. The school is attributed to Akṣapāda Gautama (or Medhātithi Gautama, perhaps the same person), traditionally said to be the composer of the Nyāya Sūtras (which were likely a prolonged compilation from his time up to the 2nd century BC). Regarding the date of these texts, note that: (a) they are supposed to post-date the Vaiśeṣika school, even though arguably more “fundamental” (b) they had a heavy influence on Bauddha logic, the first glimpses of which can be seen in the Kathāvatthu c. 240 BC (c) the first explicit of the school mention comes from Nāgārjuna, c. 200, but a “takki vimamsi” school is mentioned in the Pāli Canon (Aṅguttara Nikāya 3.60: Saṅgārava-sutta) and said to have existed in the time of Buddha (d) they seem to have been the most responsible for the formalization of epistemology, probably motivated by their overwhelming patronization of formal debate, and all other schools seemed to have already adopted it by the 3rd or 2nd centuries BC. Thus I would probably date the origin of the school to 500—300 BC.
Vaiśeṣika — the theory of atoms and elements, i.e. reductionism. Attributed to Kaṇāda, c. 600 BC.
Sāṃkhya — mind-body dualism. Attributed to Kapila, 700—600 BC. This is attested in the the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 5.2 (600—500 BC), and in the Buddhacharita (c. 100), and the school is widely acclaimed in Hindu literature starting from the Śuṅga period; subsequent scholars of importance included Āsuri and Pañcaśikha, and the work Ṣaṣṭitantra, none of which survive.
Yoga — meditation. Academically, Yoga was understood as the practical application of the Sāṃkhya philosophy (see e.g. Katha Upaniṣad 2.6.6—13, c. 500 BC), but its meditative practices predate Sāṃkhya, and are already described in the earliest Upaniṣads (e.g. Bṛhadāraṇyaka 1.5.23, Chāndogya 8.15) c. 800 BC.
Mīmāṃsā, or Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā — the rationalization and exegesis of rituals and hymns; the stance being that rituals and hymns are embedded in physical law (without the need for real gods or metaphysics), and the determination of these laws through radical critique. In this phase, this school had not yet taken its name but developed in the form of the Vedāṅga literature, which is divided into:
Kalpa (rules of life and ritual): Gṛhya (800—500 BC), Dharma (600—200 BC) and Śrauta (800—300 BC) Sūtras of various authors
Jyotiṣa (astronomy/astrology): Vedāṅga Jyotiṣa (compiled 700—200 BC) of Lagadha
Śikṣā (phonetics): the padapāṭha and prātiśākhya texts (~1000—800 BC)
Chanda (prosody): the Chandaḥśāstra of Piṅgala (c. 300 BC)
Vyākaraṇa (grammar): the Pre-Pāṇinian grammarians Āpiśali, Kaśyapa, Gārgya, Gālava, Cākravarmaṇa, Bharadvāja, Śākaṭāyana, Śākalya, Senaka, Sphoṭayāna (700—500 BC)
Nirukta (epistemology): The Nirukta of Yāska (700—500 BC). According to Patañjali (180 BC), they often clashed with the grammarians.
Vedānta, or Uttara-Mīmāṁsā — the exegesis of Brahman and Ātman; in this period its texts were continuing Upaniṣads.
Descriptions of NS schools. Most of what we know of these schools come from the Buddhist Pāli Canon (Brahmajāla and Samaññaphala Suttas) and the Jain Agamas (Agama 2: Sūtrakṛtāṅga), which were redacted from the 5th—1st century BC. Ājīvika is also described in Patañjali’s Mahābhāsya 3.96 from 180 BC. All of these schools’ founders were said to be contemporary to or slightly earlier Buddha and Mahavira, thus in the 6th century BC.
Ājīvika — determinism or denial of free will. Attributed to Maskarin Gośāla.
Akriyā — amoralism, because moral responsibility and causation aren’t real. Attributed to Pūrṇa Kāśyapa.
Śāśvata — amoralism, because materialism. Attributed to Pakudha Kaccāyana. Also believed in atoms and elements.
Ajñāna — agnosticism or disregard for metaphysics (not radical skepticism as often claimed). Attributed to Sañjaya Vairatiputra.
Descriptions of NB (Cārvāka). Positivism and either ethical egoism or utilitarianism; dating from the 6th century BC or earlier. A note on the names used for this school.
Jain texts describes the philosophy of Ajita Keśakambali as the the -vāda (doctrine) of Uccheda (“annihilation” of soul), Tam-jīvam-tam-śarīram (“identity of soul and body”), Dēhātma (“the body is the soul”)
Lokāyata and Ānvīkṣikī mean “knowledge of the physical world” and “scientific inquiry” respectively; Cārvāka is called by these names because it holds these to be the only valid sciences.
Bārhaspatya: besides Cārvāka, there is also a school of Arthaśāstra (economics) and a school of Dharmaśāstra attributed to Bṛhaspati. In fact, Bṛhaspati is said to be the earliest of economic theorists. While the description of the economic school by Kautilya does bear a resemblance to Cārvāka (in denying that the Vedas are a valid domain of knowledge, or that Dharma is a valid Puruṣārtha), the Dharmaśāstra school actually appears to be quite orthodox. It is possible that Bārhaspatya was simply the gotra of several prominent early theorists. It is worth noting that Bṛhaspati and Śukra are said to be the preceptors of the gods and of the demons respectively, and are also regarded as the expounders of the earliest economic schools. Kautilya often criticizes the latter, along with Kaṇiṅka Bhāradvāja, for being too amoral in their ways. It is possible that Bṛhaspati and Śukra represented two different strains of Cārvāka, with the former still aligned with the orthodoxy on matters of morals although for rational rather than metaphysical reasons and the latter more given to amoralism like the Śāśvatas.
These names are identified with each other in several places in the available literature. Unlike the NS schools, Cārvāka is well-attested in both AB and AS literature, and remained prominent well into medieval times, as attested by the many rebuttals against it by the scholars of other schools. Some references to read more about this:
[2a] Ramakrishna Bhattacharya (2011), Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. 251 pages. Full text from archive.org.
[2b] Ramakrishna Bhattacharya (2002), Cārvāka fragments: a new collection. 44 pages. Library access from JSTOR; Full texts from academia.edu, researchgate.net. [!!! a collection of all surviving fragments of the Cārvāka Sūtras]
Canonization period (300—100 BC)
The following may be regarded as the “canonical texts” of the philosophical schools (except the NS schools, which seem to have been lost, perhaps due to persecution by Aśoka c. 250 BC).
the Nyāya Sūtras, canonized c. 320 BC or 180 BC.
the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, c. 180 BC.
the Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa c. 350 (earlier works are lost).
The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali c. 180 BC, and the Yoga-Yājñavalkya, shortly thereafter
the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra of Jaimini, c. 320 BC or 180 BC.
the Brahma (or Vedānta) Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, c. 180 BC.
the Pāli Tripiṭaka of Buddhism, canonized c. 250 BC.
the Agamas of Jainism, canonized c. 180 BC.
the Bhagavad Gītā, representing all AB schools, canonized c. 320 BC or 180 BC.
the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, formalizing the grammatical tradition, c. 320 BC.
Imperial patronage was a significant cause for canonization, especially the patronage of Hindu schools by Puṣyamitra Śuṅga (c. 180 BC) and perhaps also Candragupta Maurya (c. 320 BC), of Buddhism by Aśoka (c. 250 BC) and of Jainism by Khāravēḷa of Kaliṅga (c. 180 BC).
The theme of canonization extended beyond philosophy. Puṣyamitra Śuṅga’s reign alone was responsible for the compilation of much of “Hinduism” as we know it: the epics (Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa), the grammatical text Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, the completion of the medical Suśruta and Caraka Saṃhitās (whose compilation had begun c. 600 BC). Patañjali himself was probably the royal priest of Puṣyamitra.
Classical period (100 BC—500)
On the canon alone, one notes Hindu and Jain canons to have been more focused on rational enquiry and pure philosophy, whereas the Buddhist canon is more centered on the personality cult of Buddha, and having more “religious” elements to it. This gulf shrinks in the classical period as the schools begin to mix and influence one another — and also as Hindu philosophy absorbs the theistic influences of the Bhāgavata and Śaiva cults.
For the latter, I will point to the following book on the rise of Hindu theocentric sects :
[3] RG Bhandarkar (1913), Vaishnavism, Shaivism and minor religious systems. 175 pages. Full text from archive.org.
This was the peak of their relative cultural foothold for the Buddhists in India, and the main growth in Indian philosophy in this period came from the development of their philosophy, in particular of the Mahāyāna school. I will describe these in another post with a bibliography of major Indian literature, as I do not think there is much else in detail to comment on it.
Reformation period (500—1500)
Hindu scholarship saw a revival in the late Gupta period (~5th cen) in science as well as philosophy. With regards to philosophy in particular, two trends of note emerge: (1) the growth of several reformations or sub-schools and (2) formal scholarship on pre-existing religious cults.
With regards to the first, the notable reformations are:
Advaita Vedānta (“Monistic Vedānta”) expounded by Gauḍapāda (6th cen), Ādi Śaṅkara (8th cen), Maṇḍana Miśra (8th cen)
Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta (“Qualified Monistic Vedānta”) expounded by Rāmānuja (11th cen)
Dvaita Vedānta (“Dualistic Vedānta”) expounded by Madhvāchārya (13th cen)
Theistic Nyāya expounded by Jayanta Bhatta (9th) and Udayana (10th cen)
Navya-Nyāya (“New Logic”) expounded by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya (14th cen)
The logical expositions of the Mīmāṃsā school are also worthy of note for their contributions to the philosophy of language, e.g. Bhartṛhari (5th cen), Prabhākara (6th cen), Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (c. 700). Also worth a mention are the epic compositions of Vidyāraṇya (the Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha) and Vācaspati Miśra summarizing and comparing the works of various schools.
This is only a small sample of the scholars and works of this period; it’s a long period, and works from this period onward are much better preserved than in the previous periods, with vast numbers of even unimportant philosophical treatises still extant today. The Wikipedia pages on the respective darśanas provide more than a decent bibliography; for an in-depth exposition see:
[4] Karl Potter (1977), The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vols 1-26: ~19,000 pages. Full texts of vols 1-5, 7-10 from archive.org, library access of vol 6 from JSTOR, no clue about the rest.
Something I will note is the close link between these reformations and the growth of theocentric Hinduism as seen in the Purāṇas and in the Bhakti school: as before, the rationalization of religion is a motive for philosophy, and in this case the heavy emphasis on a personal God (Saguṇa Brahman) was the motive for the Vedānta reformations.